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The Changing Structure of the
Securities Markets and the




In the early 1960s, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") con-
ducted a special study of the United States ("U.S.") securities markets whose
significance was widely recognized.' In some respects, this study was born of a
crisis2 which itself was rooted in changes that had occurred since the early 1930s
when the federal securities laws were adopted and the SEC was established.3 The
study resulted in several regulatory initiatives by the U.S. Congress and the SEC
which both reflected and instigated changes in the structure of the U.S. securities
* Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, California. Commissioner, United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, June 1984-July 1988. B.A. 1963, College of New Rochelle;
J.D. 1973, University of Southern California.
**Fulbright Scholar, June-December 1988, Tokyo, Japan. Counsel to the Commissioner, United
States Securities and Exchange Commission, December 1986-June 1988. B.A. 1980, Cornell Univer-
sity; J.D. 1983, University of North Carolina.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Commission, other Commissioners, or the staff of the Commission.
1. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE HOUSE COMMERCE COMMITTEE, H.R. Doc.
No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. (1963)[hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY]. The SPECIAL STUDY has been
characterized as "undoubtedly the single most influential document published in the history of the
SEC." J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 299 (1982).
2. See J. SELIGMAN, supra note I, at 277-89, 296. Events that bear mentioning include a spate of
fraudulent new stock offerings, a breakdown in American Stock Exchange regulatory oversight and
delays in processing securities trades. Id. What was referred to as the May 1962 market "break"
provided additional impetus. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, at 7. As applied to the stock market,
the term "Market Break" refers to a period of unusually active trading in which price movements are
both erratic and dramatic, and in which the avalanche of orders subjects market mechanisms to
extraordinary strain.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 882, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., 2-4, reprinted in 1961U.S. CODE CONO. & AD.
NEWS 2557-2562. For a history of the SEC and the evolution of the federal securities laws, see
generally J. SELIGMAN, supra note I.
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markets.4 Twenty-five years have passed. The securities markets have come
through another crisis, the Market Break of October 1987 ("October Market
Break").5 Naturally, the October Market Break has spawned its own generation
of studies.6
There is no doubt that the U.S. securities markets of today are as radically
different from those of the 1960s, as those of the 1960s were from those of the
1930s. The many differences reflect fundamental changes in the structure of the
securities markets and the securities industry, and have far-reaching implications
for international securities regulation.7
The most significant of these structural changes is that the U.S. securities
markets and their counterparts around the world have become unequivocally
international. Internationalization is the product of and the moving force behind a
wide range of structural changes occurring in the capital markets and the se-
curities industry, but it is only one of the forces bringing about structural change.
Two other contributing forces are the integration of the financial services industry
and the institutionalization of the markets. Perhaps the most significant out-
growth of the confluence of these forces is the marked interdependence of world
markets. This interdependence was graphically demonstrated by the global pro-
portions of the October Market Break, which lent new significance to the
adage-"When New York sneezes, Tokyo catches cold." The lesson learned in
October 1987 was that, in a very real sense, world markets have become linked.
This article addresses the impact internationalization has had on the world's
4. The SPECIAL STUDY "provided a foundation for most of the reforms that occurred in the
securities industry during the ensuing fifteen years." J. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 299. Legislative
action included the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964);
regulatory reforms included the unfixing of stock exchange commission rates, see infra note 118 and
accompanying text, and the development of over-the-counter automated quotation systems, see Simon
& Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17,
26-44 (1986).
5. See infra notes 92-123 and accompanying text.
6. The first round of studies has been completed. They include: PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON
MARKET MECHANISMS (1988); DIVIsION OF MARKEr REGULATION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK REPORT (1988) [hereinafter MARKET
BREAK REPORT]; DIVISIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND TRADING AND MARKETS OF THE U.S.
COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, INTERIM REPORT TO THE COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION ON STOCK INDEX FUTURES AND CASH MARKET ACTIVITY DURING OC-
TOBER 1987 (1987) and FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF STOCK INDEX FUTURES
MARKETS DURING OCTOBER 1987 (1988); M. MILLER, J. HAWKES, B. MALKIEL & M. SCHOLES,
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE CHICAGO MERCANTILE
EXCHANGE TO EXAMINE THE EVENTS SURROUNDING OCTOBER 19, 1987 (1987); N. KATZENBACH,
AN OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM TRADING AND ITS IMPACT ON CURRENT MARKET PRACTICES (1987).
7. Between the 1930s and the 1960s, there were tremendous increases in the sizes of the securities
industry, public investor participation, and the securities markets, particularly the OTC market. See I
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, at III, XV. That growth continued over the next 25 years, and the
securities markets also became institutional and international, and linked to the recently developed
stock index future markets. See infra notes 8-59, 92-123 and accompanying text.
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securities markets with a particular focus on its role in forcing change in the
structure of those markets. Part I describes the forces involved in the interna-
tionalization process, and analyzes capital movement and other phenomena that
demonstrate the extent of internationalization. Next, it reviews the structural
changes that securities markets and the securities industry have made in response
to the internationalization process. Part II analyzes the measures regulators have
taken to address the implications of those developments. Part III discusses the
October Market Break and how it illustrates the interdependence and institu-
tionalization of international securities markets. Part IV suggests that the events
of last October have or should have changed our perception of the world and
discusses the issues regulators will have to address in order to deal with interde-
pendence, volatility and other characteristics of internationalized capital markets.
Part V recommends that regulators respond to these issues by adopting a multi-
lateral approach to certain international securities regulation issues.
I. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF GLOBALIZATION AND STRUCTURAL
CHANGE
A. Factors Contributing to the Internationalization Process
The long-term causes and effects of the globalization process are difficult to
isolate and define. Nevertheless, it is pertinent and helpful to point out certain
developments that clearly contributed to, if not initiated, the internationalization
process.
Approximately twenty years ago, for economic reasons, issuers, investors and
market professionals started to look beyond their borders for business and invest-
ment opportunities. Issuers, including those from the U.S., were engaged in the
perpetual quest for cheap capital. The corollary to that phenomenon was inves-
tors' search for diversity in and a greater return on their investment portfolios.
These desires resulted in occasional international securities transactions. All that
was needed to internationalize the markets further was a cost-effective way for
market professionals-brokers, dealers, investment bankers, and investment ad-
visors-to bring together issuers and investors from around the world.
The continuing advance of telecommunications and data processing tech-
nology provided accessible and relatively inexpensive links between geograph-
ically separated issuers and investors. The speed, efficiency and accuracy with
which market information may be transmitted and investment decisions may be
implemented with the assistance of modern technology has opened up new
worlds of opportunity and made it easier for issuers and investors to exploit those
international opportunities.
Finally, the globalization process was fueled in part by government privatiza-
tion programs. Significantly, offerings of securities in public entities tend to be
larger than local markets can absorb; consequently, international interest often is
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necessary for success. 8 Many of the most notable privatizations have involved
large public stock offerings conducted on a multinational basis or with significant
foreign investor participation. The United Kingdom ("U.K.") has been the
leader in this area, and can count among its privatization efforts four of the
largest public stock offerings in history.9 The privatization trend has swept over to
France, where shares have been publicly offered in several national banks and
companies.' 0 Privatizations in Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, and even the U.S.
demonstrate this is a global phenomenon."
B. Perspectives on the Extent of Internationalization
Capital markets throughout the world became international quite rapidly, al-
most in tandem with the growth of the bull markets of the five years from 1982 to
1987.2 Today, there are established international markets for the issuance and
trading of numerous types of securities, including sovereign and corporate debt,
convertible bonds and warrants, equities, and even derivative products such as
options and futures on sovereign debt, foreign currencies, and stock indexes.
Privatizations are only one example of the fact that issuers and investors are no
longer restricted to their local markets. Available statistics support the proposi-
tion that increasing amounts of capital are flowing across national borders. For
example, foreign transactions in U.S. stocks and bonds totaled $295 billion in
1982. In 1987, the total was $3.3 trillion, up 1100%.1 3 United States transactions
in foreign securities during 1982 totaled $76.6 billion. In 1987, the figure was
$591 billion, an increase of 770%.I4 These figures, however, are merely the
readily identifiable manifestations of more significant changes in investment and
capital raising strategies.
For example, other statistics indicate that internationalization has changed the
8. Lord Rockley, Sale of Shares in State Enterprises, Discussion Paper Presented to the Ilth Ann.
Conf. of the Int'l. Assoc. of Sec. Comm'ns., Paris, France, July 16-18, 1986, at 11.
9. These were the $12 billion British Petroleum, the $8 billion British Gas, the $5 billion British
Telecom, and the $2.3 billion Rolls Royce multinational common stock offerings. See Forman,
British Petroleum Trading in London is Subdued as Buy Back Plan Cuts Fears, Wall St. J., Nov. 2,
1987, at 6; Sacher, Going Private, Fin. World, Jan. 20, 1987, at 112-116; Feder, Rolls Jet Engine
Maker Soars in Initial Trading, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1987 at DI.
10. See France Offers Bank Stock, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1987, at D 15, col. 4; Revzin, France Urges
Citizenry to Break With Habit, Become Stockholders, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
11. See International Corporate Report, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1985, at 19, col. 6 (Singapore
Airlines Ltd.); Bourse Report, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1985, at 24 (Malaysian Airlines System); Interna-
tional Corporate Report, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1987, at 42, col. 3 (Nippon Telegraph & Telephone
Corp.); Selby, Inside the Conrail Deal, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Int'l. Ed.), Apr. 1987, at 217.
12. For a discussion of the five year global bull markets, see infra notes 105-109 and accompany-
ing text.
13. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY BULLETIN, Table CM-V-I (Mar. 1983);
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY BULLETIN, Table CM-V-I (Mar. 1988).
14. See id. Table CM-V-2 (Mar. 1983 & 1988).
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way in which investors structure their portfolios. Private sector pension funds
from industrialized nations are diversifying into foreign stocks and bonds, with
the percentage of total assets invested in this manner doubling in the last six
years. U.K. funds are the most diversified with 20% invested in foreign se-
curities, while U.S. funds are among the least with 4% so invested. 5 The ten-
fold increase in foreign securities transactions between 1982 and 1987 also re-
flects this diversification. 16
Figures relating to international bond and equity offerings are similarly in-
structive and demonstrate that internationalization has changed the way in which
issuers raise capital. Companies from all over the globe are locating and using
markets in which the least expensive financing is available without regard to
geographical proximity to their base of operations. The highly developed interna-
tional bond markets include Eurobonds, which are issued multinationally, and
foreign bonds, which are issued in a single overseas market. In 1987, issuers
tapped these markets for $177 billion, 22% less than the record amount raised in
1986 but more than double the 1982 total.'7 For the first time last year, Japanese
issuers surpassed those from the U. S. as the largest users of international bond
markets, accounting for 17% of new issue volume. U. S. issuers were a mere .5%
behind, followed by issuers from the U. K. and France."
Companies also have taken advantage of new opportunities to offer stock in
overseas markets. The international equity market affords a corporation the op-
portunity to issue securities in several markets outside its home market. Interna-
tional equities, which generally are referred to as Euroequities, include stocks
offered both simultaneously in multiple markets and in a single foreign equity
market. Unlike the international bond markets, no sharp distinction is made
between Euromarket and foreign issues. Notwithstanding tremendous recent
growth, the Euroequity market is small compared to the Eurobond market.19 New
issues in the fledgling Euroequity market totaled a record $18 billion last year,
over five times the 1985 total and nearly ten times that in 1984.20 German, Italian,
15. REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMIT-
TEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, at 11-77
(July 27, 1987) (hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY).
16. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY BULLETIN, Table CM-V-I, CM-V-2
(Mar. 1983); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY BULLETIN, Table CM-V-1, CM-V-2
(Mar. 1988). See also supra text accompanying notes 13 and 14.
17. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FIN. STATISTICS
MONTHLY (PT. 1), Table S.1 (Jan. 1984); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVEL-
OPMENT, FIN. STATISTICS MONTHLY (PT. 1), Table S.I (Mar. 1988). See also INTERNATIONALIZATION
STUDY, supra note 15, at G-3 to G-5.
18. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FIN. STATISTICS
MONTHLY (PT. 1), Table S.2 (Jan. 1988).
19. See INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY, supra note 15, at 11-52 to 11-55.
20. See Annual Financing Report, EUROMONEY (SPECIAL SUPP.), Mar. 1988, at 32;
INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY, supra note 15, at 53.
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and British issuers have been the major players in this market, although U.S.
companies gradually are becoming more active."z
Securities offerings by foreign issuers in the United States ("Yankee Offer-
ings") are significant for what they portend for the future when multinational and
overseas offerings may be commonplace. Although still only a small fraction of
overall international financing, the growth of Yankee offerings over the last five
years illustrates this market's potential. Foreign corporations and governments
raised $2.5 billion in the U.S. in 1982. The total in 1987 was $8 billion, over
300% higher.
22
C. Response of Securities Markets To Internationalization
The impact of globalization on the various marketplaces in countries around
the world and on the trading in those markets has been varied but nevertheless
significant. As technology made offshore markets increasingly more accessible
to investors, markets were forced to become more competitive in order to main-
tain and increase their market share of trading volume and listings. The changes
have been dramatic and have included structural changes, such as international
and domestic electronic market linkages, as well as internal market reforms.
International electronic trading and quotation linkages have proliferated during
the past several years. 23 Trading linkages currently exist between three U.S.
exchanges and two Canadian exchanges.2 4 There also are quotation linkages
between the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the Inter-
national Stock Exchange ("ISE") in London and the Stock Exchange of Sin-
gapore. 25 In addition, there is an arrangement between the American Stock
Exchange ("Amex") and the European Options Exchange in Amsterdam for
trading fungible stock index options.2 6 The Montreal Exchange and the Van-
couver Stock Exchange are linked to both Amsterdam and Sydney for options
21. See INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY, supra note 15, at 11-55 to 11-57.
22. See SEC OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SEC MONTHLY STATISTICAL REVIEW, Tables
M-350, M-370 (Mar. 1983); SEC OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SEC MONTHLY STATISTICAL
REVIEW, Tables M-350, M-370 (Mar. 1988).
23. For a discussion of the economics of international market linkages, see Cox & Michael, The
Market for Markets - Development of International Securities and Commodities Trading, 36 CATH.
U.L. REV. 833 (1987).
24. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 23,075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854 (Mar. 28, 1986)(Midwest-Toronto);
Sec. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 22,442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201 (Sept. 20, 1985)(American-Toronto); Sec.
Exch. Act Rel. No. 21,925, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,480 (Apr. 8, 1985)(Boston-Montreal). See also
INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY, supra note 15, at V-49 to V-57.
25. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 23,158, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,989 (Apr. 21, 1986)(ISE); Sec. Exch. Act
Rel. No. 25,457, 52 Fed. Reg. 9156 (Mar. 14, 1988)(Singapore).
26. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 24,831, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,368 (Apr. 14, 1987); Sec. Exch. Act.
Rel. No. 24,832, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,377 (April 14, 1987).
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trading. 27 Furthermore, the European Community ("EC") expects to link the
stock markets of twelve member states into a continuous trading network in the
fall of 1988.28 Moreover, discussions are pending that could result in additional
linkages between U.S. and foreign markets .29
Another approach taken by stock exchanges to enhance their competitiveness
in this era of global markets has been to combine with other domestic markets.
The U.S. securities exchanges have been electronically linked since the late
1970s.30 Following the U.S. pattern, exchange markets in several countries are
joining forces with their domestic counterparts in varying ways. For example, in
1987 the four Hong Kong exchanges merged into a unified exchange with one
trading floor,3' and the six Australian and eight German stock exchanges recently
became electronically linked and centrally governed integrated markets.32 U.S.
markets now are exploring a second generation of alliances. For example, the
Chicago Board Options Exchange has merged with the Cincinnati Stock Ex-
change,33 and has a joint venture with the Chicago Board of Trade for dual
trading of futures and options .
4
Securities markets' efforts to increase their competitiveness have included
significant internal structural reforms. Some of these reforms were brought
about, at least in part, by the realization that domestic markets were becoming, or
were likely to be, non-competitive in the global context. The most dramatic
reformation to date was the U.K.'s Big Bang in October 1986. Prodded by the
27. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL TREATMENT STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TREATMENT OF U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKING AND SE-
CURITIES ORGANIZATIONS( 1986 UPDATE) 58 (Dec. 18, 1986).
28. See Quinn, Europeans Tie the Knot, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1987, at 185. The
exchanges of Amsterdam, Athens, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Frankfurt, Lisbon, London, Lux-
embourg, Madrid, Milan, and Paris will be participating in the Interbourse Data Information System.
Id.
29. The New York and Midwest Stock Exchanges are considering linkages with the ISE, and the
New York and Amsterdam Stock Exchanges also are considering one. See McMurray & Anders, Big
Board, London Exchange Discuss Trading, Data Reporting Joint Ventures, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1985,
at 3, col. 2; Grant, Midwest Discussing Trading Link With London, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG.,
Feb. 9, 1987, at 8; Dutt, Big Board Explores Amsterdam Link, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Apr. 21,
1986, at 6.
30. The American, Boston, Midwest, New York, Pacific, and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges were
linked for real-time consolidated transaction and composite quotation reporting in 1974 and 1978
respectively, and for trading in 1978 by the Intermarket Trading System. See Simon & Colby, supra
note 4, at 50; Cox & Michael, supra note 23, at 846-850.
31. See Hong Kong Trading Comes of Age, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1987, at D16; Hong Kong Stock
Exchanges: Four Into One Won't Go Easily, ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 1986, at 77.
32. See Birth of the Australian Stock Exchange, EUROMONEY (SPONSORED SUPP.) Feb. 1986, at
115-117; Eight Exchanges, One Voice, EUROMONEY, Feb. 1986, at 159.
33. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 24,090, 52 Fed. Reg. 5225 (Feb. 19, 1987).
34. See Markets Form Joint Venture, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1988, at D4; McMurray, CBOT Forms
Joint Venture With CBOE, Wall St. J., June 26, 1987, at 2, col. 6. Regulatory approvals will be
necessary before dual trading commences.
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British government, the ISE unfixed commission rates, abolished the single
capacity system prohibiting member firms from acting as both brokers and deal-
ers and removed restrictions on foreign ownership of member firms.3 5 In addi-
tion, the exchange merged with the association for the Euromarket houses,
thereby creating a unified market for British and international equities.36
To facilitate the growth of its marketplace, the ISE implemented an entirely
new trading system that allows members to execute trades on the exchange floor
and upstairs through a computerized trading system. It also provided for real-
time quotations and, for the more actively traded securities, real-time transaction
reporting. Within months of implementation of the new trading system the bulk
of the trading took place upstairs. Consequently, the exchange decided to close
its trading floor because of lack of use. 37
Other countries are following Britain's example with their own versions of
"Big Bang." Canada and France are implementing structural reforms whose
hallmarks will be the opening, over time, of the Toronto Stock Exchange and
Paris Bourse to foreign investment firms and domestic and foreign banks.38 The
Paris Bourse also is extending its traditional two-hour trading day and exploring
continuous trading.39 In addition, Spain is planning sweeping structural reforms
which should include opening the stock market to banks and foreign brokers and
a shift to continuous computerized trading.'
Of course, U.S. markets are not immune to the pressure of competition from
abroad, nor are they oblivious to the fact of internationalization. Therefore, they
also are adapting themselves to the new competitive environment. In the process,
the markets are changing their basic structure. For example, to increase the
capital available for marketmaking, the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"),
with SEC approval, recently began permitting retail member firms to acquire
specialist units, a relationship that had been previously prohibited. The stated
purpose of this change is to give the specialist, who is responsible for making fair
and orderly auction markets on the exchange floor, access to the substantial
capital needed to compete in today's global markets. 4'
A further response to international competition both in the U.S. and abroad
has been to modify exchange listing standards to accommodate foreign issuers.
35. See, e.g., Flinging Open the Doors of Change, EUROMONEY (BIG BANG SuPP.), Aug. 1986, at
2.
36. See Way Cleared for Merger of London Exchange, IRSO, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1986, at 64.
37. See Almond, Computers Kill London Tradition, Wash. Times, Mar. 4, 1987, at 12C.
38. See Jordan, Canadian Financial Services - The New Broom, 3 FIN. SERV. REG. (S&P) 177
(1987); Lewis, Foreigners Will Be Able to Own French Brokers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1987, at DI.
39. See Roth, Battling for Survival, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 32D.
40. See Bray, Spain Aims to Computerize Trading, Break Brokers' Monopoly Over Exchange, Wall
St. J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 32D.
41. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 23,768, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,183 (Nov. 13, 1986).
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The NYSE and the Amex proposed, and the SEC approved, 42 rule changes to
allow them to waive listing standards with which foreign firms cannot comply
because of legal or practical impediments. The waivers apply to certain corporate
governance and disclosure requirements. 43 Similarly, the Tokyo Stock Exchange
has streamlined the disclosure requirements that foreign issuers must satisfy in
order to list." In addition, the EC has issued directives establishing minimum
listing standards, disclosure standards for companies that are to be listed and
periodic reporting requirements for listed companies, thus making it possible to
use a single text to list simultaneously in member states' markets.
4
D. Effects of Internationalization on the Structure of the Financial
Services Industry
Internationalization has had as significant an impact on the financial services
industry as it has had on the markets. One such effect is the erosion of sectorial
barriers in the financial services industry. In the U.S., Japan and Canada, the
different sectors of the financial services industry (banking, securities and insur-
ance) have been separated by statute. During the past two decades, these stat-
utory barriers have been eroded by competitive market forces. 46 Globalization
has accelerated this erosion and changed the structure of U.S. banking. As a
result, U.S. banking is adapting to the structure prevalent in most countries,
where banks engage in all facets of commercial and investment banking.
Major U.S. banks are deriving increasing portions of their domestic revenues
from activities that skirt the edges of the Glass Steagall Act47 such as mergers and
acquisitions, private placements and loan sales. 48 Furthermore, notwithstanding
Glass Steagall, the bank regulators have recently authorized U.S. banks to en-
42. See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
43. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 24,634, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (June 29, 1987). The Commission
also approved the NASD's new OTC transaction reporting plan which provides foreign issuers with
similar waivers of the plan's periodic reporting and corporate governance requirements. See id. at
24,231 n. 9; Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 24,663, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,234 (June 23, 1987).
44. See The Nikko Perspective in International Equities, EUROMONEY INT'L EQUITIES SPECIAL
SURVEY (SPONSORED Supp.), Nov. 1986, at 3.
45. Address by Geoffrey Fitchew, Director General for Financial Institutions and Company Law,
Commission of the European Communities, European Stock/OTC Markets Conference (New York,
Oct I. 1987)(discussing the European Community's legislation on securities markets)[hereinafter
Fitchew Address]. See also 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 66) 21 (1979); 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
100) 1 (1980). All but two member states have conformed their laws to the terms of these directives.
See INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY, supra note 15, at 111-77.
46. Of course, during the past seven years, U.S. bank regulators have assisted and encouraged this
erosion. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
47. Banking Act of 1933, Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter Glass-Steagall Act].
48. See, e.g., Weberman, First Join 'Em, Then Beat 'Em, FORBES, Feb. 23, 1987, at 152.
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gage in an array of securities activities domestically that they previously had been
able to do only overseas.
49
Globalization has increased the pace of the involvement of U.S. and Japanese
banks in the securities aspects of the financial services industry. This has been
possible because neither Glass Steagall nor its Japanese counterpart apply extra-
territorially. In many instances, American and Japanese banks are learning the
securities business through their participation in the internationalization process.
Large U.S. and Japanese banks are becoming major players in foreign securities
markets by acquiring local securities firms or developing securities expertise in
their worldwide branch networks. By following either or a combination of these
strategies, the Citicorps and the Industrial Bank of Japans of the world are
becoming leading securities underwriters and traders. 50
The British, Canadian and French "Big Bangs" mean that their securities
markets will be open to U.S. banks.5' Recently, the Japanese Ministry of Finance
authorized certain U.S. and British banks to operate securities subsidiaries in
Japan.52 The interesting, albeit anomalous result is that a bank, technically pre-
cluded from engaging in a full range of securities business in the U.S., may or
may soon do so in Britain, Canada, France and Japan.
Globalization also has had a significant effect on securities industry structure.
Securities firms are modifying their structure as they position themselves to meet
the challenges posed by internationalization. The first step in this process has
been the acquisition of additional capital or at least gaining access to it. In this
regard, many major U.S. securities firms have merged into much larger Ameri-
can companies engaged in such disparate businesses as insurance, retailing and
manufacturing.53 Other U.S. securities firms have increased their capital by
forming joint ventures with or selling significant minority interests to non-U.S.
enterprises.54
49. See Fed Approves Underwriting Applications of J.P. Morgan, Citicorp, Bankers Trust, 19 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) 628 (1987); Fed's Section 20 Decision Stayed; More BHCs Win Underwriting
Approval, 19 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) 739 (1987); Fed's Section 20 Orders Upheld, But Market
Share Test Reversed, 20 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) 225 (1988).
50. See Berg, Citicorp Buys Australian Brokerage, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1987, at D4, col. 1; Sesit
& Herman, Aubrey G. Lanston & Co. Will be Sold to a Unit of Industrial Bank of Japan, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 30, 1986, at 3, col. 1; Sesit, Industrial Bank of Japan Expands Role to Win Slice of World's
Investment Banking Business, Wall St. J., July 16, 1985, at 36, col. 3.
51. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
52. See Sesit, Japan to Allow Securities Units for U.S. Banks, Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1987, at 2, col.
5; Midland Bank Unit Wins Securities License in Japan, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1986, at 23, col. 3.
53. See Rozen, Bearing Gifts: Wall Street's Best, and Worst, Corporate Parents, INVESTMENT
DEALERS' DIG., Apr. 20, 1987, at 18.
54. The leading joint venture is between the First Boston Corp. and Credit Suisse. See Winkler,
First Boston Venture With Swiss Thrives, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1987, at 24, col. 1. Three major firms
recently sold interests to Japanese enterprises. See Nash, Goldman's Japan Tie Cleared, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 20, 1986, at DI, col. 1. (12.5% nonvoting limited partnership interest sold to Sumitomo Bank
Ltd.); Cowan, Japanese Partnerfor Shearson, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1987, at DI, col. 5 (13% interest
MARKET STRUCTURE AND REGULATION 29
Another notable feature of the internationalization of the securities markets has
been the dramatic overseas expansion of major securities firms. During the bull
market of 1982-1987, U.S. firms established new or significantly enlarged exist-
ing branches or affiliates in Europe and Japan.55 In turn, Japanese and European
firms have established footholds in North America.5 6 With far flung networks of
offices linked by sophisticated telecommunications technology, securities firms
have given meaning to the concept of global markets in which firms underwrite
and trade securities around the world and around the clock.
57
In the wake of their global expansion, U.S. securities firms seem to be re-
evaluating the benefits of integration and being able to offer clients a full range of
financial products and services. As a result, some firms are reducing the services
and products offered to their clients.58 Whether this development reflects a long
term trend to focus resources on higher margin activities or rather is simply the
natural outgrowth of unfettered competition is difficult to determine. The current
retrenchment is probably a result of both and does not in any way reflect a step
backwards in the globalization process.59
II. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO CHANGES IN THE SECURITIES
MARKETS WROUGHT By GLOBALIZATION
Regulators of the international securities markets are intensely aware of the
pressures forcing change in their respective markets, and are aware that signifi-
cant developments abroad may and generally do have profound effects on their
domestic markets. They also have recognized that these conditions make some
degree of international regulatory cooperation necessary. Nevertheless, reg-
ulators generally have not developed comprehensive standards for regulation of
the international securities markets. Rather than formulating broad cooperative
measures that anticipate potential problems, regulators have devised narrow and
often unilateral responses to specific market regulation issues as they arise. The
sold to Nippon Life Insurance Co.); Gilpin, Japanese Buy Stake in Paine Webber, N.Y. Times, Dec.
1, 1987, at DI, col. 1 (25% equity stake sold to Yasuda Mutual Life Insurance Co.).
55. See Schmerken, Waving the Flag Abroad, WALL ST. COMPUTER REV., Oct. 1987, at 17.
56. See Japan on Wall Street, Bus. WK., Sept. 7, 1987, at 82; Laursen, Can British Banks Survive
in the USA?, INVESTMENT DEALERS' Dio., June 22, 1987, at 22. That expansion continues unabated.
See Sesit, Foreign Firms Are Eager to Capture Bigger Chunck of U.S. Equity Market, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 16, 1988, at 51, col. 2.
57. See How Merrill Lynch Moves Its Stock Deals All Around the World, Wall St. J., Nov. 1, 1987,
at 1; Marion, Creating A Global Book, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1987, at 265.
58. See Picker, Ebb Tide on Wall Street, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Dec. 1987 at 64; Forman,
Britain's Deregulation Leaves a Casualty Trail in the Securities Industry, Wall St. J. Oct. 14, 1987, at
I.
59. While cutting back selectively in the U.K., see supra note 58, U.S. firms are expanding
significantly in Japan. See Sulkin, U.S. Finance Firms in Japan Expect to Expand Staff, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 28, 1988, at 11.
30 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS
exception to the general rule has been international surveillance and information
sharing, where the emphasis is on cooperative efforts to enforce existing laws,
not the adoption of new substantive rules.
A. U.S. Regulatory Response
The responses of U.S. regulators to international developments have for the
most part been focused on fostering competition and preventing business from
flowing off-shore while assuring that investor protection standards are main-
tained. As disccussed below, U.S. regulators have exhibited the appropriate
flexibility in their approaches to bank securities activities, trading practices dur-
ing securities distributions and foreign broker-dealer registration, but more flexi-
bility than necessary as far as the NYSE and Amex foreign listing rules are
concerned.
1. Bank Securities Activities
The gradual breaching of the Glass Steagall Act's separation between commer-
cial and investment banking 6° has raised important market integrity and investor
protection concerns. As an initial response, the SEC adopted Rule 3b-9 under the
1934 Act requiring banks engaged in certain securities activities to register as
broker-dealers. 6' The courts overturned Rule 3b-9, 62 but not until after most
banks registered their securities affiliates. The SEC then proposed legislation
essentially implementing Rule 3b-9 through statutory amendment.
63
Congress is considering legislation that would repeal the Glass Steagall Act in
its entirety.64 The SEC's position on this issue is that banks can be as active as
they care to be in the securities industry as long as those activities are conducted
through affiliates registered with the SEC, and there are adequate safeguards
against conflicts of interest and related investor protection concerns. The SEC,
therefore, has made its support for the repeal of Glass Steagall contingent upon a
requirement similar to Rule 3b-9.
65
60. See supra notes 47-49.
61. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 22,205, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,385 (July I, 1985).
62. See Am. Bankers Ass'n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
63. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
MODIFY THE DEFINITIONS OF BROKER AND DEALER IN THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
(May 4, 1987). Draft bills implementing the proposed amendments have been introduced in the
Senate and House. See S. 1175, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S.6224 (May 8, 1987); H.R.
2557, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H. 4056 (May 28, 1987).
64. The Senate passed such a bill on Mar. 30, 1988, and transmitted it to the House of Represen-
tatives for its consideration. See S. 1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 CONG. REC. S. 3520 (Mar. 31,
1988).
65. See MEMORANDUM OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COM-
MERCE CONCERNING FINANCIAL SERVICES DEREGULATION AND REPEAL OF THE GLASS STEAGALL
ACT (Apr. II, 1988).
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2. Trading Practices During International Securities Distributions
The proliferation of multinational stock offerings in the Euroequity market
66
has raised a growing number of questions about the extraterritorial applicability
of Rules lOb-6 and lOb-7 under the 1934 Act. Rule lOb-6 is an antimanipulative
rule generally prohibiting persons engaged in a securities distribution from ar-
tificially conditioning the market to facilitate the distribution. Rule lOb-7 pro-
vides a safe harbor from this prohibition for transactions that stabilize the
market. 67 The SEC's position has been that these rules apply extraterritorially to
overseas distribution participants who are affiliated with U.S. distribution par-
ticipants or when the distribution in which they are participating occurs partially
in the U.S. The rationale is that activities of these overseas distribution partici-
pants could adversely affect the U.S. market for the security being offered .68
On eight occasions in 1987, the SEC was faced with requests from non-U.S.
distribution participants for exemptions from Rules lOb-6 and lOb-7 so that they
could continue certain customary activities in foreign jurisdictions that would
violate the rules. The SEC granted the requests, but only after imposing condi-
tions to assure that these overseas activities would not result in a manipulation of
the U.S. markets. In this way, the SEC accommodated Rules lOb-6 and lOb-7 to
the realities of international securities offerings while taking into account the
protections that the federal securities law provide U.S. investors.69
3. Foreign Broker-Dealer Activities
The development of international linkages and the concomitant increased inter-
national dissemination of market information ° has brought foreign broker-deal-
ers within the 1934 Act's broker-dealer registration requirements which, like
Rules lOb-6 and lOb-7, 7' have extraterritorial application. These requirements
apply extraterritorially when a foreign broker-dealer employs U.S. jurisdictional
66. See supra notes 9 and 19-21 and accompanying text.
67. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6, lOb-7 (1987). Rule 10b-6 achieves its objective by generally
prohibiting distribution participants from bidding or purchasing or inducing purchases of the security
subject to the distribution either just before or during the distribution. Id. The rules apply to
distribution participants' affiliates. Id. § 240.10b-6(c)(6).
68. See INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY, supra note 15, at V-77 to V-85. See also infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
69. See letters regarding The British Petroleum Co., p.l.c. (Available Oct. 14 & Nov. 6, 1987); The
International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland (Available Oct. 5,
1987); Banco de Santander, S.A. (Available July 29 & Oct. 26, 1987); Banco Central, S.A. (Avail-
able July 1, 1987); Companion Telefonica Nacional de Espana, S.T. (Available June 12, 1987); C.H.
Beazer (Holdings) PLJC (Available May 28, 1987); Rhone Poulenc, S.A. (Available Mar. 17, 1987).
The SEC also granted three other requests for relief. See letters regarding Tokio Marine Fire Insur-
ance Co. (Available Oct. I, 1987); Barclays PLC, Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 24,487, 38 S.E.C.
DOCKET 461 (May 19, 1987); Phillips, N.V., Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 24,486, 38 S.E.C. DOCKET
457 (May 12, 1986).
70. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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means to offer or sell securities in the U.S. The jurisdictional means requirement
is readily satisfied. It encompasses use of U.S. mails or any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce.72
The SEC has reconciled its broker-dealer registration requirements to the
practical needs of internationalization by not requiring registration every time
foreign broker-dealers have used U.S. jurisdictional means. In determining
whether registration is necessary, the SEC has analyzed how widespread a for-
eign broker-dealer's solicitations to U.S. investors and trading in the U.S. have
been. For example, the SEC has issued no-action letters permitting U.K. market
makers, without registering as broker-dealers in the U.S., to enter quotations into
the ISE's automated quotation system that would be disseminated in the U.S.
through the NASD-ISE quotation linkage or the ISE's TOPIC services.73
4. NYSE and Amex Foreign Listing Standards
The NYSE's and Amex's desire to obtain more foreign listings led the two
markets to propose rule amendments that would permit the waiver of certain
listing standards for foreign issuers. Among other things, the rule amendments
allowed the waiver of U.S. voting rights requirements which conflicted with
common practices in the issuers' home countries.7 4 These proposals raised very
difficult questions about the extent to which accommodations should be made to
U.S. regulations to facilitate internationalization. Unlike the Rules lOb-6 and
l0b-7 and foreign broker-dealer matters, 75 they involved the domestic rather than
the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities regulation. Moreover, they were
in direct conflict with the purposes of the SEC's almost simultaneously proposed
Rule 19c-4 under the 1934 Act.
76
Proposed Rule 19c-4 reflected a fundamental policy determination that it was
necessary for the protection of investors to prohibit publicly-held, listed com-
panies from disenfranchising their shareholders. The proposed rule would ac-
complish this objective by generally prohibiting any U.S. market from listing or
continuing to list the equity securities of any issuer that takes any action that
nullifies, restricts, or disparately reduces shareholder voting rights. However, the
rule as proposed includes an exemption for foreign issuers,77 the appropriateness
of which is questionable. If Rule 19c-4 were adopted without such an exemption,
a foreign issuer with a "one share/one vote" or a dual capital structure could
initially offer securities to U.S. investors and list on a U.S. market. Once listed,
however, a foreign issuer generally could not alter the proportionate voting rights
72. See INTERNAI ONALIZAT ION S'TuDy, supra note 15, at V-41 to V-42.
73. See id. at V-42 to V-47.
74. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
76. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 24,623, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,665 (June 22, 1987).
77. See id. at 23,671-74.
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of its securities in a way that disenfranchised its existing shareholders without
running afoul of Rule 19c-4's proscription.78
Despite the broad shareholder suffrage concerns underlying Rule 19c-4, a
majority of the SEC voted to approve the NYSE and Amex foreign listing
standards as proposed.7 9 The majority apparently believed that these rules, with
the voting rights waiver included, were needed to facilitate foreign listings in the
U.S. markets. The majority also felt that U.S. investors would be better pro-
tected if they could purchase those foreign securities in the U.S. While the latter
point may be true, it was not necessary to waive Rule 19c-4's disenfranchisement
protection to encourage foreign companies to list in the first place. Foreign
companies with dual class capitalization still would be able to list; only those
companies that already were listed would be prohibited from disenfranchising
their U.S. shareholders. The majority, therefore, inappropriately discounted the
importance of providing investors in foreign securities that are publicly-traded in
U.S. markets with the protections of Rule 19c-4, and thereby inappropriately and
unnecessarily established a double standard for U.S. and foreign issuers.
B. International Regulatory Responses
The regulatory responses of markets abroad to globalization have, on occa-
sion, been coordinated with and, in some respects, have been similar to U.S.
regulation. For example, this trend is apparent in the measures that foreign
markets are taking to provide for insider trading prohibitions and formal self-
regulatory structures.
Insider trading once was proscribed only in the U.S.,80 but a number of
countries recently have adopted such laws. France and the United Kingdom
enacted insider trading prohibitions in 1970 and 1980 respectively, and strength-
78. The proposed rule would prohibit recapitalizations that, among other things, eliminate the
voting control of public shareholders, offer lower voting stock with higher dividends in return for
stock with higher voting rights and condition voting rights of shares on the length of time the shares
have been held or the amount of shares owned. See id. at 23,673.
79. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 24,634, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (June 23, 1987). Four Commis-
sioners voted for approval; Commissioner Peters abstained because she disagreed with the voting
rights waiver for the reasons discussed above, but otherwise strongly supported the thrust of the
amendments. The Commission also voted to exclude foreign equity securities from proposed Rule
19c-4. See Sec. Exch. Act Rel. No. 24,623, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,665 (June 22, 1987).
80. Insider trading is prohibited in the United States by Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1982), and Rule lOb-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1987). In addition, Section 14(e) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982), and Rule 14e-3 thereunder, 17 C.ER. § 240.14e-3 (1987),
proscribe such conduct in the context of a tender offer. Rule l0b-5 was adopted in 1942, see Sec.
Exch. Act Rel. No. 3230, 13 Fed. Reg. 8177 (May 21, 1942), and was supplemented in 1980 by Rule
14e-3, see Sec. Act Rel. No. 6239, 45 Fed. Reg. 60418 (Sept. 4, 1980).
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ened those prohibitions in 1983 and 1985 respectively.8 Sweden made insider
trading illegal in 1985. Amsterdam Stock Exchange rules essentially accom-
plished the same objective in the Netherlands in 1986,82 and the Swiss Parliament
gave final approval to a statutory prohibition against insider trading in December
1987.83 Additional laws can be expected. Japan plans tougher insider trading
prohibitions.8 4 Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and New Zealand are consider-
ing new restraints,85 and the EC has proposed a directive prohibiting insider
trading.86
The U.K.'s post-Big Bang regulatory framework exemplifies the trend towards
more structured oversight of securities markets with a view towards investor
protection. The new Financial Services Act 1986 imposes a statutory scheme of
self-regulation in the U.K. which is similar to the U.S. system in the sense that
regulatory responsibility is shared by the markets and government. Under the
Act, the U.K. government delegated many of its powers to the Securities and
Investments Board ("SIB"), a body funded and staffed by the industry. The SIB,
in turn, has delegated supervisory control of different sectors of the industry to
self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"). The ISE is the principal such SRO.87
C. Surveillance Information Sharing Exceptions
A significant exception to the general rule that international securities regula-
tion has been unilateral rather than cooperative is the negotiation of bilateral
memoranda of understanding ("MOU") and surveillance agreements designed to
facilitate enforcement of the local securities laws in global markets. The SEC has
entered into bilateral information sharing agreements with authorities in the
United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland and, on January 7, 1988, Canada.88
81. See Lightburn, Insider Trading in France, INT'L. FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1988, at 23, 23-24;
Grass, Insider Trading in the U.K., SEC. TRADERS' MONTHLY, Jan. 1987, at 14. France is consider-
ing another strengthening of its insider trading laws, see Insider Trading in France, supra, at 26-27,
and the U.K. intends to make insider trading an extraditable offense, see Insider Curb in British Bill,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1988, at 48.
82. See Rundfelt, Insider Trading Regulation in Europe, I J. AccT., AUDITING & FIN., Spring
1986, at 125; Fouquet, Europe Studying Ways to Fight Insider Profiteering, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 1987,
at E3.
83. See Swiss Vote Insider Penalties, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1987, at 40. See also Haymann, Swiss
to Outlaw Insider Trading, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1987, at 30.
84. See Japan Insider Curbs Asked, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1988, at D22; Japan Finance Agency
Studies Ways to Alter Insider Trading Term, Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1988, at 30.
85. See Europe Studying Ways to Fight Insider Profiteering, supra note 82; New Zealand to
Introduce Rules on Insider Trading, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1987, at 12.
86. See Fitchew Address, supra note 45, at 16.
87. See generally Abrams, The U.K. Financial Services Act 1986, 3 REV. FIN. SERV. REG. (S&P)
101 (1987); Brayne, The U.K. Financial Services Act 1986, 20 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. (S&P) 51
(1987). The new regulatory framework took effect on April 29, 1988. See Cohn, Tough Securities
Laws For a Wary London, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1988, at Dl.
88. See Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information Between the United States
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The U.S./Canada MOU is particularly significant because the scope of as-
sistance to be provided thereunder is broader than in any prior MOU. The MOU
provides that the parties will seek legislative authority to allow them to conduct
investigations on the others' behalf.8 9 Once fully implemented, the MOU would
allow the SEC to obtain testimony and documents from persons residing in
Canada through subpoenas issued by the Canadian regulators, and would author-
ize the SEC to provide similar assistance to Canadian regulators. 9° The MOUs
that the U.S. has with Canada and the U.K. are supplemented by surveillance
and information sharing clauses that the SEC has required to be part of linkage
agreements between U.S. and foreign securities markets. 9'
III. THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK
Clearly, the October Market Break was one of the most dramatic events in the
history of the U.S. financial markets. The steep and abrupt decline in the markets
was, to say the very least, startling. Although some found the precipitous adjust-
ment in the market on October 19, 1987 "breathtakingly efficient," most found it
a cause for alarm.
The SEC's Division of Market Regulation prepared a comprehensive study of
the Market Break, which was released on February 2, 1988.92 A full and detailed
analysis of the SEC Staff Study on the Market Break and the SEC's findings is
not within the scope of this article. However, a brief summary of those matters is
necessary to lay a foundation for the conclusions which are influenced by percep-
tions and observations drawn from the Market Break.
The SEC Staff Study does not answer the question of why the market value of
Securities and Exchange Commission and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in
Matters Relating to Securities and Between the United STates Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry in Matters Relating to Futures (Sept.
23, 1986), reprinted in 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1431 (1986); Memorandum of the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Finance
on the Sharing of Information (May 23, 1986), reprinted in 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1429 (1986);
Memorandum of Understanding (Aug. 31, 1982), 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1 (1983) (between the
United States and the Swiss Confederation); Memorandum of Understanding between the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Ontario Securities Commission, the Commis-
sion des valeurs mobilieres du Quebec, and the British Columbia Securities Commission (Jan. 7,
1988), reprinted in - INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS - (1988). See also INTERNATIONALIZATION
STUDY, supra note 15, VII-60 to VII-68.
89. The SEC agreed to propose such legislation to Congress on May 5, 1988. See SEC to Seek
Authority to Conduct Probes at Request of Foreign Governments, 20 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) 676
(1988).
90. See supra note 88.
91. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. See also INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY,
supra note 15, at V-57 to V-60.
92. See MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra note 6.
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common stocks decreased by over 30% in October 1987. 93 Rather, it reconstructs
and analyzes trading activity during the period from October 6 to October 21,
with a view to determining what happened. The Staff concluded that the initial
decline that immediately preceded the October 19 Market Break was triggered by
changed investor perceptions regarding investment fundamentals and economic
conditions.9 4 This conclusion is certainly correct but does not expressly identify
that which the evidence suggests was the principal trigger of the Market Break in
the U.S., namely the announcement that the House Ways and Means Committee
had agreed upon a proposed tax bill that would have disadvantaged takeovers and
leveraged buy-outs. 95 Thus, the perception by institutional investors that the
takeover premium component of their holdings was threatened triggered a mas-
sive sell-off notwithstanding the very uncertain future of the bill. Therefore, to
the extent the proposed bill was a factor, the market's reaction was not a particu-
larly rational response.
The SEC Staff Study found that rapid stock and futures sales by institutions
were a significant factor in accelerating and exacerbating the declines experienced
during the October Market Break. 96 During specific critical time periods on
October 19, for example, index arbitrage, index substitution or portfolio insur-
ance 9 7-or all three-accounted for between 30% and 65% of total NYSE vol-
ume in the stocks comprising the S&P 500 index. 98 The trading that occurred
between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. that day is illustrative. The combination of selling
from portfolio insurance and index arbitrage totalled more than 40% of volume in
the S&P 500 stocks, and more than 60% in three different 10 minute intervals
within that hour.99
Based on the analysis contained in the Staff Study of the Market Break, the
93. See id. at 2-1. This calculation is based on movements in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the
most widely followed U.S. stock market indicator. Using other measures, the declines still would
have been greater than 20%. See id.
94. See id. at 3-9 to 3-11.
95. For one of the more thoughtful early analyses of the effects of the proposed takeover tax bill,
see Yardeni, That M&A Tax Scare Rattling the Markets, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1987, at 26.
96. See MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra note 6, at 3-11.
97. Index arbitrage involves offsetting stock and stock index futures purchases and sales designed
to profit from pricing discrepancies between the stocks comprising the index and the future. Index
substitution is a form of index arbitrage employed by a fund that seeks to replicate the performance of
a stock index by holding each of the component stocks in proportion to its weighting in the index.
Portfolio insurance refers to dynamic hedging strategies designed to control market risks in diversi-
fied portfolios by buying and selling futures. For stock portfolios replicating an index, these strategies
call for futures sales as stock values decline and futures purchases as stock values increase. Id. at 1-2
to 1-5.
98. See id. at 3-12.
99. See id. Concentrated institutional stock selling also was the largest single direct factor respon-
sible for the NYSE's initial opening declines on October 19. Continued institutional selling, com-
bined with panic selling in a broad range of stocks and an absence of buyers, contributed to the free-
fall decline in the final hour of trading that day. Id. at 2-19, 3-11.
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SEC reached four broad conclusions as a result of which it made a number of
specific recommendations to the U.S. Congress. '00 The first conclusion is that the
markets for stock, stock index futures and stock index options form a single
market.' 0 1 The second conclusion is that new trading mechanisms, such as com-
puter-assisted portfolio insurance and index arbitrage, cause extraordinary vol-
ume and volatility that can overwhelm the capacity of the markets. The volume
and volatility is in part an outgrowth of the institutionalization of the market and
institutions' use of these trading strategies. 02 The SEC's third conclusion is that
there are weaknesses in areas such as specialist and market maker performance,
capital adequacy and clearing and settlement that must be remedied. 03 Finally,
the SEC concluded that the events of October 19 and 20, 1987 dramatically
confirmed the globalization of the securities markets."°4
A. The Interdependence of the World's Securities Markets
The most significant change in the world capital markets brought about, or at a
minimum heightened, by globalization is their interdependence. Markets no
longer can be viewed as standing separate and independent of one another. The
very changes that have made markets more competitive and more accessible to
issuers and investors wherever situated have also made the markets more suscep-
tible to experiencing the after-shocks of problems elsewhere. As a result, global
markets signify much more than the opportunity to raise capital 10,000 miles
from one's base of operations or to trade securities around the world and around
the clock. The degree of interdependence, even if only psychological, demon-
strates a synergism that must be taken into account by the markets, the industry
and the regulators.
Markets gradually became interdependent as they gradually became global.
There were clear signs before October 1987 that activity in and the perceived
integrity and fairness of one market could have significant consequences for
another. The 1982-1987 bull market, which actually was a global phenomenon, 05
100. For a discussion of some of these recommendations, see infra notes 135-137 and accompany-
ing text.
101. See U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE OCTOBER 1987
MARKET BREAK 5 (Feb. 3, 1988) [hereinafter SEC RECOMMENDATIONS]. The SEC stated that the
boundaries between these three physically distinct marketplaces "are crossed to such an extent and
with such frequency that these markets are unified," and that "IsItock index futures and stock index
options are used as economic substitutes for NYSE stocks." Id.
102. See id. at 5-7. The SEC recognized that "[o]n October 19 and 20 the amount for portfolio
selling was so large ... that market mechanisms adequate for the vast majority of trading situations
failed on a massive scale." Id. at 6.
103. See id. at 8, 10-12.
104. See id. at 8. The SEC found that, "[in a sense, the market for United States equities can be
viewed as including not only the domestic futures, options, and stock markets, but the major foreign
markets as well." Id.
105. See, e.g., The Roaring Eighties, ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 1987, at 84.
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can be seen as a prime example of this interdependence. In the U.S. the Dow
Jones Industrial Average ("DJIA") reached 2,746 on August 25, 1987, its high-
est level in history. This was over three times its level in August 1982 just five
years previous. 0 6 Markets in other countries experienced similar unprecedented
rises. For example, in 1987 Japan's Nikkei Dow Jones Industrial Index ("Nikkei
225") and the U.K.'s Financial Times-Stock Exchange 100 Index ("FT-SE 100")
also approached three times their August 1982 levels. 0 7 Yet, in several of those
markets, particularly the U.S. and Japan, unprecedented growth was not ob-
viously related to changes in fundamental economic factors. 08 While other devel-
opments such as increased takeover activity in the U.S. and lack of alternative
investments to stocks in Japan could explain the 1982-1987 bull market in those
countries, 0 9 the global bull market can be explained, at least in part, by psychol-
ogy. In other words, the growth in one market spurred increases in other markets,
or more precisely investors' perceptions of the significance of growth in foreign
markets stimulated growth in their own markets.
The global Market Break of October 1987 underscored the extent to which all
markets have become interdependent. It was expected that the ability of investors
to move capital from one market to another easily and rapidly might have "dra-
matic" consequences." 0 However, it is apparent that less concern has been given
to the psychological links between the markets. An examination of intra-day
price movements in several international markets before, during and after the
October Market Break demonstrates there are strong ties between the world's
equity markets.
The downward price movements during the two-week period beginning Oc-
tober 14, 1987 were striking in the suddenness with which they occurred and in
the fact that they occurred in all major markets. This is particularly significant
because the stock market declines occurred in countries such as Japan and Ger-
many which did not have the economic problems (to wit, declining currency
values, trade deficit and budget deficit) identified by some as the causes of the
U.S. market decline."'
106. See id.; MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra note 6, at 2-1. The DJIA is a broad-based index
consisting of the 30 most actively traded, highly capitalized NYSE-listed companies.
107. See The Roaring Eighties, supra note 105. The Nikkei 225 and the Fr-SE 100 also are broad-
based indexes. The former consists of the 225 most highly capitalized Tokyo Stock Exchange listings
and the latter of the 100 most actively traded ISE stocks.
108. See, e.g., That M&A Tax Scare Rattling the Markets, supra note 95; The 'Crash of '88'
Scenario, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1987, at 49.
109. See id.
110. However, the evidence gathered by the SEC Staff suggests that international equity trading
(whether it was sales by foreign investors trading in U.S. markets or sales of U.S. securities in foreign
markets) did not have a disproportionate effect on the decline of U.S. markets in October 1987. See
MARKEr BREAK REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-2 to 11-3. But see Ricks, Task Force's Brady Says
Japanese Sales of U.S. Bonds Touched Off'Oct. 19 Crash, Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1988, at 18.
11I. See, e.g.,Extraordinary Butchery, EcONOMIsr, Oct. 24, 1987. at 75, 76 (currency volume);
MARKET STRUCTURE AND REGULATION 39
During the week of October 12th, the DJIA declined by a total of 9.6%. Tokyo
reacted quickly on Monday, October 19. Heavy selling pressure forced the Tokyo
market down steadily throughout the day to close down 2.3%. Trading opened in
London later that day, already down 7.8% from the previous week. The London
market steadily declined throughout early trading, and closed down 12.6% for
the day. The U.S. market followed, opening down 10.9% from Friday's close. At
the time, the London market was down approximately 13% from the previous
week's close and 6% from its October 19 opening. The DJIA closed down a
record 22.6% for the day."
2
Tuesday, October 20th brought no respite. The Nikkei 225 fell 7.5% during the
morning session and dropped further during the afternoon session, for a record
one-day decline of 14.7%. When trading began in London later on October 20,
the market immediately dropped 19.3% from its previous close. In afternoon
trading, London staged a rally; the market closed down 12.2% for the day. New
York opened with the DJIA up 211 points. Although the DJIA gained 5.9% for
the day, the rally was not broad-based."
3
To measure the degree to which U.S. markets led or followed other markets,
the SEC Staff examined the correlation of movements in several international
stock indexes. 114 The data reviewed indicated that the U.S. markets did influence
price movements in other markets. The Staff found that during the weeks of
October 12 and October 19 the percentage change in the S&P 500 index had a
significant effect on the next day's values of both the Tokyo Stock Exchange's
TKE Composite and the ISE's FT-SE 100."5 The Staff also found that, during the
weeks of October 12 and October 19, movements in the TKE Composite and the
FT-SE 100 had significantly less effect on the values of the S&P 500 index."
6
Naturally, caution should be used in drawing conclusions from this correlation
data. Nevertheless, it does appear that a market event such as that which occurred
in October 1987 can be expected to cause significant reaction and change in other
markets even though the triggering event has no clearly identifiable connection
with those markets.
In Our Hands, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at 38 (trade deficit); Fire Alarm on Wall Street, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1987, at A34 (budget deficit).
112. MARKE-T BREAK REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-5 to 11-6.
113. Id. at 11-6.
114. See id. at 11-6 to 11-7, 11-24 to 11-25. The Staff calculated partial correlation coefficients
between intra-day percentage changes in the S&P 500 and subsequent opening values, early trading
values, closing values, and close-to-close movements of the Tokyo Stock Exchange's TKE Composite
and the ISE's FT-SE 100 during the period from October 12 through October 23, 1987. The staff also
examined the correlation coefficients assuming the foreign market led the U.S. market. Partial
correlation coefficients measure the degree to which two variables (for example, two stock indexes)
move together. Id. at 11-6.
115. See id. at 11-6 to 11-7.
116. See id. at 11-7. The staff found that TKE Composite movements had relatively small effects on
the S&P 500, and that the FT-SE 100 had effects that were greater, but much smaller than those the
S&P 500 had on the FT-SE 100. Id.
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B. The Institutionalization of the Securities Markets
As indicated, the SEC concluded that trading by institutions contributed signif-
icantly to the U.S. market decline in October 1987. In fact, the breadth and size
of the market break reflects the degree to which the investor community has
gradually become institutionalized and the impact this phenomena has had on the
markets. The influence of institutions on the market was felt long before October
1987. For example, institutions' increasing investment in stocks traded in the
over-the-counter ("OTC") market served to make the NASD's multiple market
maker system a formidable competitor to the venerated specialist/auction market
of the NYSE." 7 Moreover, institutions spearheaded the drive to unfix brokerage
commissions" 8 and their investment strategies and goals spurred the development
of block trading" 9 and computer-assisted trading 120, all of which have had a
profound effect on the structure, liquidity and efficiency of the market.
The Market Break of October 1987 was a rude reminder of significance of
institutional trading both with respect to the strategies used and the size of
transactions executed. Institutions were the predominant source of selling pres-
sure during the week of October 19, 1987 and their concentrated activity during
critical periods accelerated and exacerbated the decline."' Noting that certain
trading strategies by institutions contributed significantly to the Market Break,
however, is not to say that these strategies or those that use them are villains. As
former SEC commissioner Bevis Longstreth stated, "[T]he market was a victim
of its own successes."' 22 Mr. Longstreth properly points out that although new
117. The OTC market encompasses all securities trading that takes place off the floor of a stock
exchange. The NASD is the SRO responsible for OTC market oversight, and operates the NASDAQ
system, which provides a medium by which broker-dealers making markets in OTC stocks dissemi-
nate quotations and enter trade reports. See generally NASD, THE NASDAQ HANDBOOK (1987).
From 1980 to 1986, NASDAQ grew more rapidly than the NYSE and the Amex, and now ranks third
in the world behind only the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges in terms of equity trading dollar
volume. Id. at 14. During roughly the same period, institutional holdings of NASDAQ stocks grew
nearly 3.5 times from $20 billion to $68.6 billion. Id. at 196.
118. See J. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 473-86.
119. See 8 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 87-95 (1971). A block generally consists of
10,000 or more shares and, because of its size, "cannot be executed in the exchange auction market in
the normal course." Id. at 87. A broker-dealer acting as a block positioner ordinarily assumes
responsibility for executing the block in a fair and orderly manner, and does so through one or a
combination of the following strategies. The first is to work the block in smaller pieces through the
specialist on the exchange floor. The second is to arrange contra side interest upstairs and bring the
trade to the floor for the specialist to cross. The third is to take all or some of the block into inventory.
Id. at 87-90.
120. See MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra note 6, at 3-2 to 3-5.
121. See MARKET BREAK REPORT, supra note 6, at 2-8, 2-19 to 2-20. See supra notes 96-99 and
accompanying text.
122. Longstreth, Villains, Victims and Volatility After Black Monday, Chi. Tribune, Apr. 5, 1988,
at 15.
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products (e.g., futures and options) and advances in technology have vastly
improved today's markets, they also have had undesirable side effects, including
the potential for increased volatility.23
IV. THE POST-OCTOBER MARKET BREAK REGULATORY ISSUES
The purpose of the foregoing discussion was to demonstrate that interna-
tionalization and related forces have had a dramatic impact on market structure
worldwide. The process has also played a significant role in shaping the invest-
ment strategies and objectives of market participants. Notwithstanding the fact
that major market centers have made determined efforts to retain their respective
unique characteristics, they have been forced by international competition to
assume some of the trappings of competing markets.
In many respects, the interdependence of individual capital markets is high-
lighted by characteristics they share. One such characteristic is their vulnerability)
to trading dominated by institutional investors whose concentrated market power
can drive prices down as rapidly as it can drive prices up. 124 A second is that both
the banking and securities industries increasingly are competing to provide the
same services to investors and issuers. 25 A third is that international securities
markets themselves are changing their structure to accommodate foreign
customs, practices and laws in order to attract and retain listings and order flow,
and thus may be harmonizing themselves into homogeneity.
2 6
The emergence of a new global environment in which there are interdependent
markets with common characteristics requires regulators to reexamine their ap-
proach to international securities regulation. In the past, some regulators have
followed a laissez-faire approach, relying on the notion that the markets are
efficient and will develop in the optimal manner if left to their own devices.
Others, cautious about relinquishing any sovereignty, have resisted the concept of
formulating international initiatives imposing substantive regulation on their mar-
kets. The narrow scope of the initiatives regulators have undertaken thus far
reflects these attitudes.'27
The October 1987 Market Break demonstrates that regulators worldwide
should consider a different and potentially radical approach to regulating the
international securities markets. Regulators wedded to the efficient market hy-
pothesis 2 8 need to forego blind reliance on the theory as a justification for a
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 96-99, and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 24-45 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 60-87 and accompanying text. Surveillance and information sharing, where
the greatest strides have been made, involves enforcing existing laws, not imposing of new rules on
the market. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
128. The efficient market hypothesis generally provides that the stock market responds rationally to
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merely reactive regulatory posture. That theory provided a dubious basis for a
rigid laissez-faire approach before October 1987, and an untenable one after
October 1987.129 While the unprecedented volatility of today's securities markets
may reflect breathtaking efficiency, it also reflects an irrationality that should be
cause for concern, if not action.
Notwithstanding lingering doubt in some quarters, there has been significant
movement in the area of international cooperative regulation. Initiatives that
regulators have pursued thus far have laid the groundwork for more comprehen-
sive global regulatory action. These efforts demonstrate a cooperative spirit and a
nascent awareness of market interdependence. The bilateral information sharing
and surveillance agreements entered into by the U.S. and a number of other
countries 30 evince the parties' recognition of the dual needs to obtain overseas
cooperation in order to provide effective oversight of one's own markets and to
assist others in overseeing their own markets. The spread of insider trading
laws' demonstrates an understanding not only that certain regulations enhance
the perception of a marketplace's integrity and fairness, but also that a single
market will more easily integrate itself into an efficiently functioning global
marketplace the less disparate is its regulatory system. The Rule l0b-6 and lOb-7
requests for relief' reflect the applicants' tacit acceptance of the SEC's position
that these rules have extraterritorial effect, and the SEC's granting of relief
reflects a willingness to accommodate these rules to the realities of globalization.
But for the October 1987 Market Break, regulatory initiatives in the interna-
tional securities market probably could have continued to evolve slowly. How-
ever, the Market Break rather emphatically underscored the problems and
weaknesses in our markets. In seeking solutions for these matters, regulators
must adopt a balanced approach between doing something and doing nothing in
order to avoid paralysis.
The task facing regulators in this regard is a weighty one, since the many
reports on the Market Break,'33 and those yet to come, offer no definitive answer
as to why U.S. markets declined so sharply in October 1987 and why the rest of
the world followed. One explanation is that investor psychology and behavior
changed such that investors became more dynamic; they changed their holdings
available information and stock prices consequently reflect all such information. For the classic
discussion of the hypothesis, see Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
129. See Galbraith on Market's "Pixiation", Wall St. J., Mar. 11, 1988, at 39, col. 1; "Efficient
Market" Was a Good Idea - And Then Came the Crash, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 22, 1988, at 140;
Donnell, Efficient-Market Theorists are Puzzled by Gyrations in Stock Market, Wall St. J., Oct. 23,
1987, at 7.
130. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 6.
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in reaction to and in the direction of the market.'34 In addition, because institu-
tions are the dominant investors whose investment strategies seem to reflect
common tastes and beliefs, the situation inevitably led to a break in the assumed
equilibrium of the so-called efficient market.
Regulators cannot prescribe investors' tastes or beliefs, nor proscribe a change
in investor psychology. They can, nonetheless, influence these intangibles by
focusing on initiatives that have a bearing on restoring investor confidence, an
unobservable, unmeasurable but vitally important element to the stability of our
securities markets. If incorrect beliefs can cause a break in the equilibrium of the
market, regulators are correct to focus on investor confidence, particularly since
it seems that the market increasingly reacts more to perceptions about what is
happening in the market rather than to information on traditional investment
fundamentals and economic conditions.
Based on the conclusions it drew from the Market Break, the SEC made a
number of recommendations to Congress. Many of these recommendations are
very specific and are directly tied to the structure and operation of the U.S.
market. However, several of the recommendations are more universal in nature
and thus very relevant to international markets. The SEC believes that the pri-
mary response to the Market Break should be to expand the capacity of the
markets through operational reforms and coordination measures.'35 Thus, it spe-
cifically recommended, among other things, that the NYSE require increased
specialist capital and that self-clearing specialists be required either to establish
committed lines of credit or otherwise satisfy higher capital requirements.
136
The SEC also suggested changes in the stock index futures markets to improve
liquidity and alleviate the transmission of massive selling pressure and price
instability to the stock markets. Thus, the SEC recommended, among other
things, coordinated openings and closings with futures markets to follow the
stock market. It also recommended harmonization of margin requirements and
implementation of a coordinated credit, clearing and settlement system to de-
crease uncertainty about total risk exposures of market participants and enhance
the flow of credit between markets.'37
Certain of these recommendations may be implemented in the U.S. markets.
Because of the global nature of the crises and market interdependence, it is
reasonable to conclude that any U.S. regulatory initiative growing out of the
October Market Break in the U.S. would be most effective if adopted interna-
tionally. International markets would benefit significantly if uniform or at least
harmonious regulations were adopted in the areas of capital adequacy, margin
134. See BLACK, AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE CRASH (1988) (unpublished paper on file with
Michigan Journal of International Law).
135. See SEC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 101.
136. See id at 10. Self-clearing specialists process, compare, settle and finance their own securities
transactions.
137. See id. at 18-19, 14-15, and 23-24.
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requirements, position limits and coordinated credit, clearing and settlement
systems.
The extent to which broker-dealers are engaged in international activities may
have a significant impact on their ability to meet their obligations in any one
situs. Thus, capital adequacy rules relating to both market risk and credit risk
ought to be international in scope. 138 Moreover, they should take into account off-
balance sheet financing, 39 the need to harmonize pertinent accounting princi-
ples 411 and the new multilateral bank standards.'
4'
Although the SEC recommended increasing margins in the futures markets to
a level consistent to stock margins, it is not at all clear this suggestion will be
acted upon. However, if it is, margin requirements should be harmonized interna-
tionally. Experience during the Market Break demonstrated that traders unable to
effect futures transactions in the U.S. did so in London. 42 To the extent that
regulators determine margin requirements are necessary to dampen speculation
and provide order in the futures and equity markets, these initiatives will be most
effective if they are applicable in all major markets to which an investor has
access.
The rationale for increasing stock index futures margins is to reduce the high
degree of leverage that futures traders possess in relation to the stock market. '"
That rationale applies to the international markets as well. It is clear that lower
margins in the futures markets encouraged institutions to increase their holdings
by buying futures as a substitute for stock or as a hedge for long stock posi-
tions.'" If institutions transfer this trading offshore, the long-term result will
simply be creation of the same selling pressure in overseas markets that the U.S.
138. The SEC's net capital rule, 17 C.ER. § 240.15c3-1 (1987), establishes requirements for U.S.
registered broker-dealers that generally are based on the market risk of inventory positions, but does
not apply to affiliates that are not registered in the U.S. or are located overseas.
139. In the U.S., the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), which establishes U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, is developing broad standards for accounting for new
financial instruments and transactions that currently are not fully reflected in corporate financial
statements. See FASB Moves to Improve Financial Instruments Disclosure, FIN. EXECUTIVE,
Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 18. The transactions under review include activities such as interest rate swaps
that broker-dealers generally conduct through unregistered affiliates.
140. Work is underway in this area under the auspices of the International Federation of Accoun-
tants. See Jayson, IFAC's Traveling Salesman, MGMT. AccT'G, Oct.. 1986, at 22. To date, more
progress has been made with auditing standards than with accounting standards. See Acceptable
Global GAAP Still Far Off, Audit Rules Moving Already', Sampson Says, 19 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA)
529.
141. See Friesen, Comparative Bank Capital Guidelines, 3 Fi-i3. REv. FIN. SERV. REG. S&P 113
(1987); Global Capital Adequacy Test Mulled for Broker Units, INVEST. DEALER'S Dio., Mar. 7,
1988, at 6.
142. See MARKET BRFAK REPORT, supra note 6, at 2-10 to 2-11, 2-17 n.59, and 11-4.
143. See SEC RECOMMINtDATiONS, supra note 101, at 14.
144. See MARKET BREAK RE'OR'r, supra note 6, at 3-20.
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markets experienced on October 19, 1987, with the potential of triggering another
global crisis.
Position limits also act as a dampener on the trading markets. To the extent
they exist, they are generally designed to control price volatility by controlling
the amount of a product that can be purchased and thus sold by a single inves-
tor. 45 Standards and rules with respect to position limits should certainly be
coordinated among markets both domestic and international. The position limits
need not be identical in every market place but they should be required to be
aggregated so that they serve their purpose as a dampener on volatility in times of
crisis.
One of the most important areas to be addressed in the aftermath of the
October Market Break is the U.S. clearance and settlement systems. Effective
clearance and settlement systems are the backbone of an efficiently run market.
Although U.S systems performed reasonably well during the October ,Market
Break, based on SEC findings, steps will undoubtedly be taken to coordinate and
harmonize clearance and settlement across U.S. stock, options and futures mar-
kets in order to reduce the costs and risks of operational and financial failure in
periods of volatility. Parallel, coordinated international initiatives should be un-
dertaken to facilitate cross-border settlements. For example, initiatives to in-
crease automation; develop compatible systems, and standardize or harmonize
settlement cycles, delivery requirements and standards relating to financial re-
sponsibility and operations would be very beneficial.
V. THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
COOPERATION
The October Market Break demonstrated that financial markets, although sep-
arate and distinct, are interdependent and thus function with a ripple effect.
Therefore, unlike manufacturing industries or other service industries, financial
markets cannot seek disparate solutions to common problems without risking
calamitious results. Consequently, a new approach to international securities
cooperation is needed in order to address effectively the regulatory issues dis-
cussed above. Comparable rules for the major markets worldwide should be
devised in certain specific areas, and multilateral negotiations may be the most
efficient means to achieve this objective.
Thus far, bilateral negotiations have been the principal means by which inter-
national regulatory cooperation has been achieved. Indeed, such negotiations
have provided a very effective and efficient vehicle for developing arrangements
145. See SEC R-COMMENDArIONS, supra note 101, at 32. The SEC, however, concluded that it
would not be necessary to decrease or aggregate position limits if other recommended measures were
implemented.
46 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF SECURITIES MARKETS
for sharing information, obtaining assistance in enforcement investigations and
promoting worldwide market surveillance.146
The appeal of bilateral agreements is that they may be formulated and imple-
mented as rapidly as the parties desire. More importantly, they may be tailored to
the specific goals of the parties. Thus, in the experience of the SEC, the informal
bilateral agreement has proven a very useful tool in obtaining assistance from
abroad in enforcement matters. Its usefulness is due in no small measure to the
fact that the bilateral agreement has permitted regulators to develop the concept
and scope of international cooperation in the securities area over a period of time.
This evolutionary approach permitted the fact of cooperation to proceed while the
concept was refined in accordance with experience. Given their success, reg-
ulators should continue to pursue bilateral agreements.
However, informal bilateral agreements may be, in the words of the noted
economist Henry Kaufman, ". . . inadequate to deal with the vicissitudes in the
international financial area."'' 47 Mr. Kaufman suggests creating an international
institution with the authority to set uniform trading, accounting, capital and
disclosure standards for the international markets and the professionals that oper-
ate in them.148 Mr. Kaufman is on the right track in his views about the problem
to be solved; however, an international institution may not be the best way to
achieve those objectives. One major obstacle would be finding a way to clothe an
independent institution with the authority to dictate standards to governmental
agencies. It may be just as quick and efficient to negotiate multilateral agree-
ments as to obtain membership approval of the dictates of an international
institution.
To date, cooperative regulatory efforts in the international securities markets
have not generated multilateral agreements, in part because of concerns about
sovereign independence and the impracticality of obtaining agreement among
several parties. Nevertheless, lessons learned about the interdependence of the
international securities markets as a result of the October Market Break suggest
that multilateral negotiations are an approach that should be explored in formulat-
ing a response to the global market break. 149 For example, the problems identified
in Part IV as being potential subjects for new international regulatory initiatives
are common to most of the major markets, in that they either are related directly
to operations of international securities firms or they reflect universal vul-
nerability in the various markets. Addressing such problems on anything less
than a multilateral basis would ignore the fact of interdependence and could
146. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
147. Kaufman, The Dangerous Volatility in the Financial Markets Isn't Going Away, Wash. Post,
Feb. 4, 1988, at A23, col. 3.
148. Id.
149. See Global Bank Rules to Limit Securities Risks are Urged, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1988, at 45,
col. 3.
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result in disparate standards that might ultimately trigger or aggravate another
market disruption.
Furthermore, failing to deal with these regulatory issues on a multilateral basis
could result in rules and regulations becoming pawns in the intermarket competi-
tion for listings and order flow with potentially deleterious effects. It would be
most unfortunate if the quest for integrity, fairness and liquidity in our interna-
tional markets were undermined by an individual market's desire to attract busi-
ness at the expense of these goals. 150 An institutional investor engaged in program
trading can wreak as much havoc in London or Hong Kong as in New York. Of
course, any move to multilateral agreements must not ignore the premise that
markets are distinct and have their own unique character which should be pre-
served. Nevertheless, there are certain specific areas in which significant benefits
are to be derived by having the objective of national independence give way to the
imperative of global interdependence.
Under certain circumstances, multilateral negotiations may not only be sound
policy but also may be practicable. International regulators have been discussing
general policy questions for some time at meetings of groups such as the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions and the International Federation
of Stock Exchanges. The regular meetings of these and other groups have fos-
tered a sufficient spirit of cooperation among regulators that it may be feasible to
move beyond general discussions to concrete multilateral negotiations. The key
to success will be to ensure that any proposed initiatives are narrowly focused
responses to clearly identified problems.
Having concluded that multilateral agreements imposing international rules or
procedures are likely to be beneficial in resolving the problems identified in Part
IV above, the threshold question persists, namely what the optimal vehicle for
attaining this goal is. The possible alternatives are multilateral negotiations
among: (1) sovereign governments, resulting in treaties binding upon all signato-
ries after ratification; (2) regulatory agencies and their counterparts, resulting in
agreements to propose administrative rules for adoption in their respective coun-
tries; and (3) the SROs, resulting in similar agreements. Each of these alter-
natives has its advantages and disadvantages as is more fully discussed below.
However, considering the costs and benefits associated with each approach, mul-
tilateral negotiations between SROs presently appear to be the best approach.
A. Treaties
Sovereign governments interested in effecting international accords generally
do so by negotiating treaties. The decision to bind a nation to a treaty implicates
serious matters of national policy; in part due to this factor, the processes by
which treaties are negotiated, executed and ratified are very time consuming and
150. See A Post-Mortem on the Market Crash, Fin. Times, Feb. 11, 1988, at 12, col. 1.
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cumbersome. Unfortunately, the complexity of the process may be directly pro-
portionate to the number of persons involved rather than the nature or scope of the
subject. For example, negotiation of a treaty on securities regulation by the U.S.,
no matter how specific and narrowly focused, would probably involve the De-
partments of State, Justice, and the Treasury in addition to any number of other
agencies, including state regulators, having an interest in the regulation of the
financial services industry and therefore, by extension, our capital markets. Each
department and agency may be expected to bring its own special interests and
expertise to bear on the problem at hand.
Of course, the SEC already consults with various agencies with respect to the
formulation of bilateral agreements such as those negotiated by the SEC during
the past four years. However, in the context of treaty negotiations, as opposed to a
negotiation of informal memoranda of understanding, the process is far more
intricate and therefore more cumbersome. Departments and agencies other than
the SEC would expect and indeed undoubtedly demand to act and be regarded as
principal participants, rather than mere consultants, in the negotiation process.
Finally, treaties must be submitted to Congress for ratification. It is doubtful
that a narrowly-drawn treaty dealing with international regulation of the securities
markets would provoke the controversy or hostility encountered by other political
issues such as the trade negotiations with Canada or the disarmament negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, whether Congress would act promptly
to ratify any such treaty, or would ratify it at all, is open to question.
There are several reasons to view congressional ratification as a serious poten-
tial pitfall. One is that there is no certainty that Congress will act, even if a
proposed treaty is non-controversial. Frequently, Congress does not take legisla-
tive action where there is no political capital to be gained by or from doing so. A
second is that Congress has demonstrated over the past decade or so that it lacks
the will or the capacity to act decisively on financial issues except perhaps in
crises situations. For example, non-action on numerous legislative proposals
dealing with important issues to the financial markets such as tender offers and
the repeal of Glass Steagall have demonstrated that, at times, Congress is not
effective in striking the compromises necessary to reconcile competing interests
that are a natural occurrence in a pluralistic society. In fact, there is currently
considerable speculation that Congress will elect to do nothing in the face of the
October Market Break, not even the limited and yet logical response of merging
the regulatory oversight over securities and futures on stock indexes into a single
regulatory agency, namely the SEC.
The process and procedures applicable to the negotiation and ratification of an
international treaty are quite similar in other nations. Therefore, one would
expect to encounter similar problems. An example of the amount of time that is
or can be consumed in negotiating treaties can be found in the experience of the
EC and its efforts adopt uniform rules concerning the sale of collective invest-
ment vehicles within the common market. The EC has, as part of its charter, a
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commitment by each and everyone of its members to further their common
interests to the extent possible through eliminating barriers to international com-
merce and achieving uniformity of laws. Notwithstanding this commitment, it
required ten years for the EC to negotiate the substance of the directive relating to
the cross-border marketing of collective investment vehicles. Moreover, although
this directive was adopted by the EC in 1986, member states have until October
1989 to complete the unification process.' 5'
B. Administrative Rules
Another approach to multilateral agreements on securities regulation would be
for agencies such as the SEC and its counterparts in other countries to negotiate
standards for international securities transactions and market participants. The
agencies would then adopt the standards as rules in their respective countries.
Placing the negotiation of international multilateral accords within the admin-
istrative process has great potential. It avoids the complications of having to defer
to other governmental agencies,' and also avoids the political quicksand of
trying to sell a proposal to legislatures. It may also be presumed that a rulemak-
ing initiative will probably require substantially less time than adoption of a
treaty because an agency such as the SEC has control over its own processes.
Thus, one can conclude that the administrative approach would be considerably
less time consuming and burdensome than proceeding by way of national treaty
because third parties would be eliminated from the negotiation and adoption
stages.
Although it would avoid many of the pitfalls involved in the negotiation and
ratification of a treaty, the administrative approach has its own problems. The
SEC is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") 153 and generally
may not, therefore, adopt rules unless it provides notice and an opportunity to
comment to persons affected by the proposed rule. 114 This procedure can require
as little time as sixty days and as much as six to twelve months depending on
whether the rule is complex or controversial.
One significant drawback to the administrative process as currently practiced
under the APA is that, based on precedent and tradition, an invitation to comment
presupposes that the SEC will react to comments made. This complicates matters
when the proposal being commented upon is one whose terms have already been
negotiated with the expectation that they would not be changed substantially. If
151. See 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 375) 3 (1985); SEE ALSO INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY,
supra note 15, at IV-18 to VI-21.
152. Of course, any negotiations between an independent agency such as the SEC and its foreign
counterparts would be undertaken in consultation with other U.S. agencies so that their views could
be taken into account.
153. 5 U.S.C. § 551-59 (1982).
154. Id. § 553(b)(c).
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this expectation is to be honored, it could be argued that the opportunity to
comment on any proposed international regulatory scheme is essentially mean-
ingless and therefore in violation of the APA. This problem could be avoided to
some extent by conducting parallel negotiations with representatives of the se-
curities industry while the multilateral accord was being negotiated with other
regulators; but this would presumably lengthen the negotiations. Another alter-
native already in use at the SEC is to seek comment on the concept of a rulemak-
ing initiative and then take the comments into account when negotiating the
rule. 1
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A second significant drawback to the administrative approach is that not all of
the major markets have independent governmental agencies such as the SEC with
jurisdiction over the securities markets and authority to adopt rules affecting
those markets and market participants. For example, in Canada, France, Aus-
tralia and Hong Kong, there are governmental agencies with jurisdiction over the
securities markets. The Canadian agencies 5 6 have powers that generally parallel
those of the SEC. However, the French agency 57 does not have the authority to
adopt rules without parliamentary approval. The Australian and Hong Kong
agencies' respective jurisdictions15 are sufficiently different that it would be
difficult to work out a uniform procedural approach to a common problem.
There are no independent governmental agencies with powers approaching that
of the SEC in countries such as U.K., The Netherlands, the Federal Republic of
Germany, or Japan, where the primary regulators are the stock exchanges or
other SROs operating under the oversight of the finance ministries (or, in the case
of U.K., the Department of Trade and Industry).
C. Self-Regulatory Organizations
The final alternative is to take the first step toward negotiating multilateral
agreements through SROs such as the NASD and the various exchanges. The
SROs in major markets, regardless of the differences in the scope and nature of
their authority, have jurisdiction over most market participants through a registra-
tion process and the power to adopt rules and regulations establishing the condi-
tions upon which membership in the SRO may be acquired and maintained.
155. For example, the SEC has solicited comment on alternative conceptual approaches for
facilitating multinational offerings. See Sec. Act. Rel. No. 6568, 50 Fed. Reg. 9,281 (Feb. 28, 1985).
The SEC is still considering how best to move from the concept stage to the rule proposal stage.
156. Securities regulation in Canada is the responsibility of the individual provinces. The reg-
ulators of the Canadian provinces in which much of that country's securities business takes place are
the Ontario and British Columbia Securities Commissions and the Commission des valeurs mobi-
lieres du Quebec.
157. The Commission des Operations de Bourse is the French securities regulator.
158. The National Companies and Securities Commission regulates the Australian securities
markets, and the Office of the Commissioner for Securities and Commodities has that authority in
Hong Kong.
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There are many advantages to having multilateral international regulatory ini-
tiatives conducted through SROs. First, most exchanges are as informed and
knowledgeable as governmental agencies about the prevailing problems of the
international securities markets, including those manifested during the recent
October Market Break. Moreover, since the exchanges are the markets, they may
be more sensitive and knowledgeable about the nuances and intricacies of market
operations and thus may be in a position to develop tailor-made solutions to
perceived problems. Experience teaches us that business people, if properly
motivated, can and do move expeditiously on a project. Negotiating multilateral
accords should be no different. The exchanges can readily and easily communi-
cate the nature and scope of any proposed regulatory initiative to their members
in a less formalistic and presumably less time consuming manner than govern-
mental agencies. Informal consultations with governmental oversight agencies
should also speed up the approval process to the extent that there are systems like
that existing in the U.S., which require any rule adopted by an SRO to be
approved by the governmental agency having oversight responsibility. '
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It seems that negotiations between SROs would be the best way to achieve
multilateral agreements regulating the securities markets. One of the advantages
is that the process could be undertaken with the encouragement and under the
oversight of government regulators but nevertheless independent of them. In light
of the fact that the areas most in need of multilateral action are generally within
the jurisdiction of the SRO's (i.e., capital requirements, trading restrictions and
clearance and settlement systems), the SROs are likely to be willing to pursue
multilateral agreements simply as matters of good business and competitive
advantage if they are persuaded that such initiatives will enhance the integrity and
fairness of the marketplace and consequently boost investor confidence in those
markets. Recent experience with U.S. SROs' reactions to problems which sur-
faced in their markets during the October 1987 Market Break is instructive and,
to a certain extent, comforting in that regard.' 6° To the extent that SROs are
recalcitrant about pursuing needed accords, their government overseers have the
ability to encourage them to action.' 6'
159. In the U.S., however, this process is complicated by the fact that SRO rule proposals are
subject to notice and comment procedures similar to those imposed by the APA upon the SEC. Those
procedures are mandated by § 19(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1982), and Rule 19b-4
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1987) SRO rule changes generally are approved with little or no
modification following the notice and comment period. That should certainly be the case for those
that result from multilateral negotiations about which the SEC was consulted.
160. The exchanges and the NASD did not hesitate to take immediate and vigorous regulatory
steps to resolve these problems. See The October Market Break: Hearings before the Senate Commit-
tee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 17, 1988)(testimony of David
S. Ruder, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), at 8-21; Id. at Appendix A.
161. The U.S. stock exchanges' development of the Intermarket Trading System, see supra note
30, provides one such illustration. The exchanges developed this system so that the SEC would not
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V1. CONCLUSION
Internationalization has had a profound and far-reaching impact on the world's
securities markets. The changes brought about by the internationalization process
will not disappear even though the way they are manifested will vary depending
on the ebb and flow of the economic currents in the markets. Since global
securities markets have become a permanent, albeit ever-changing, part of the
regulatory landscape, regulators must be prepared to deal with the interdepen-
dence, volatility and other factors affecting those markets. This article suggests a
benefical approach to regulatory action. Whatever regulatory initiatives are pur-
sued, they should take into account that the market is not one-dimensional. It is
efficient at times and inefficient at others. It can be rational and emotional, act on
knowledge or react in ignorance and uncertainty. All of these attributes must be
kept in mind in formulating any regulatory response to the current market
problems.
force upon them a form of linkage that they deemed a threat to the continued viability of their trading.
See J. SELIGMAN, supra note I, at 523-33.
